Some time ago, the French government claimed that Iranian hackers had launched a cyberattack on cold storage facilities and refrigerators in France, disabling them. The accusation was widely repeated by French and Western media, and it appears that a media campaign was deliberately orchestrated against Iran.
A technical group that conducted a specialized investigation into the cyberattack on these refrigerators and cold storage facilities has shared important information indicating that the Israeli regime is probably behind the incident, while simultaneously seeking, through a media campaign, to direct the blame toward Iran.
Tasnim will expose this issue in a series of consecutive reports. In this report, technical evidence concerning Israel’s role and the absence of any Iranian involvement is presented.
Part One: The main victims of this attack were Danfoss, a Danish company’s AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 series controllers. These devices are very old, and Danfoss no longer provides security updates for them.
Data from the Censys cyber infrastructure identification platform show that, before the attack, 61 percent of the comprehensive refrigerator control panels (StoreView) worldwide were concentrated in France, and most of them were running a version in which the administrator password could be calculated based on the current date.
Directly connecting the management interfaces of industrial equipment controllers to the Internet is itself an architectural-level security flaw that any actor could exploit using a simple scanner. This attack did not require state-level operational capabilities.
This indicates that even the simplest private hackers could have accessed and taken control of this equipment. In this regard, it may be possible to find traces of individuals who are even hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran and who could have used this operation to discredit countries such as Iran and Russia. Accordingly, evidence of the presence of the Zionist regime can also be observed.
Part Two: Known vulnerabilities in the targeted equipment had existed for a long time, and patches were ignored. The AK-SM 800A device family had three known vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2025-41450: Authentication bypass
2. CVE-2025-41451: Remote code execution after authentication
3. CVE-2025-41452: Denial-of-service attack after authentication
Danfoss released patches in March 2025 and August 2025, respectively. This means that the attack involved automated scanning and large-scale exploitation of unpatched Internet of Things devices, rather than a targeted state operation.
At the Black Hat conference, Claroty, a major Israeli cybersecurity startup, demonstrated how CVE-2025-41450 and CVE-2025-41451 could be chained together and exploited to achieve remote code execution. In other words, this attack had long been within the reach of any hacker, as demonstrated by this Israeli security company. This makes the trail pointing to Israeli hackers’ involvement in carrying out the cyberattack even more pronounced.
It is worth recalling that Claroty is an Israeli cybersecurity company. Given the close relations and security cooperation between France and the Israeli regime, a serious question arises: Why did Claroty not report the technical details of this vulnerability and its exploit chain to French security authorities, such as CERT-FR and ANSSI, before the incident?
Had such an advance report been made, France could have issued a more targeted warning before the attack occurred and disconnected vulnerable devices from the Internet. No indication of such an advance warning can be found in public sources.
This point is inconsistent with France’s claim that the attack was precisely attributed through full intelligence cooperation, and shows that the official French account remains unclear in terms of transparency and technical cooperation.